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                                                                ABSTRACT 
States’ cooperation is at the core of the International Criminal Court, it requires the cooperation of 
States to carry out some of the key functions which include arrest and surrender. Without 
cooperation in arrest and surrender, the court is handicapped as it has no provision to proceed in 
the absence of the accused. States’ non-cooperation in the arrest and surrender of suspects has been 
a very big problem for the ICC. This is because of the lack of enforcement powers; it has to rely 
on States as well as the Assembly of States Parties and the United Nations Security Council to 
carry out enforcement on its behalf.  This thesis evaluates this problem with an emphasis on the 
factors that mostly account for non-cooperation. It will also analyse the Rome Statute mechanism 
on non-cooperation to find the reasons for its ineffectiveness. Finally, it will then propose the use 
of diplomatic sanctions and trials in absentia in an effort to find practical solutions to this problem.  
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1.1 Background to the Study 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is the only permanent international criminal court 
in the world. It was established in July of 2002 after the coming into force of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) that had been adopted in 1998.1 
It was established for the investigation, prosecution and punishment of perpetrators of what 
was termed by the international community as the most serious crimes namely crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, genocide2 and aggression.3 These were the crimes that states 
identified to be the most serious crimes that should not go unpunished.4 
Central to the functioning of the ICC is the cooperation of states on various aspects 
including in arrest and surrender. This cooperation has not been easy to achieve for the 
ICC despite the express obligation in the Rome Statute. This thesis discusses the non-
cooperation of states in arrest and surrender which has been a major challenge to the court. 
It will focus on its factors accounting for the high rate of non-cooperation, the effectiveness 
or lack of it in the enforcement mechanisms within the Rome Statute and possible solutions 
with an aim to enhance cooperation. 
The establishment of the ICC was a culmination of attempts over the decades by states 
especially after the First and the Second World Wars to establish an international criminal 
court5. There had been attempts as far back as after WWI to bring all perpetrators to 
account for violations of the laws and customs of war. 
                                                 
1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
2 Article 5, 6, 7 Rome Statute. 
3  International Criminal Court, ‘Resolution RC/Res.6—Aggression amendment’, 11 June 2010, 
at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf  on 28 January 2018 
4 Preamble to the Rome Statute “Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the International 
community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking 
measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation”  
5 Article 14 of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles.  
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The Rome Statute was thus negotiated and adopted against this backdrop. It was considered 
to be an institution to bring an end to impunity.  
The Rome Statute established the ICC and expressly set out the legal status and powers 
that the court would have.6 It provides that the ICC shall have “international legal 
personality” and that it has powers within the territory of any state party to the Rome 
Statute or by virtue of special agreement on the territory of a non-member state.7 States 
that are not party to the Rome Statute are therefore excluded and not subject to the 
jurisdiction of the court and are effectively immune from the reach of the ICC unless the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) through the exercise of its powers under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter imposes obligations on the non-member states in respect of a 
situation it referred to the court.8 
States’ cooperation within the framework of the Statute is fundamental to the functioning 
of the court. Cooperation in the arrest and surrender of suspects is key for the proceedings 
before the court because the Statute has no provision for trials in absentia. The accused 
persons must be present for the trials against them to proceed.9 Cooperation in the ICC has 
been a thorny issue between States and the court for various reasons. The court has 
encountered considerable levels of non-cooperation from States some of which are parties 
to the Rome Statute and have express obligations to cooperate with the requests and orders 
of the court. Non-cooperation has been a problem that has stood out for the court which 
has been compounded by the inability of the court to enforce cooperation.   
1.2 Problem Statement   
The Rome Statute establishes an obligation on States to cooperate with the ICC in arrest 
and surrender of suspects. However, the ICC has been faced with significant instances of 
non-cooperation by States despite this obligation to cooperate. This non-cooperation has 
been identified as one of the major challenges facing the court. When States’ non-
cooperation is not effectively tackled the court faces a very uncertain future. So far there 
                                                 
6  Article 4 Rome Statute. 
7 Article 12 Rome statute. 
8 Charter of the United Nations and Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute 
9 Article 63 Rome Statute   
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have been proposals made to address this problem but none of them have concretely dealt 
with it. Therefore, there is need for more study and research to identify the most significant 
causes of States’ non-cooperation and explore practical solutions. The aim of this study is 
to join the ongoing quest to determine the most significant factors influencing non-
cooperation and exploring practical effective solutions to the problem. This will be done 
through qualitative review of the relevant literature.  
1.3 Hypotheses 
There are various factors that account for States’ non-cooperation with the ICC’s requests 
for arrest and surrender, these are; conflicting obligations and interests, immunities, 
politics, lack of enforcement powers and perceptions of bias. 
The enforcement mechanisms currently provided to deal with non-cooperation have 
proved ineffective because there is no sanctioning power provided to the ASP while the 
UNSC has been reluctant to use its wide discretionary powers under Chapter VII.  
Sanctions and trials in absentia within the Rome Statute will address and mitigate the 
effects of non-cooperation on the court by providing means of coercing States to cooperate 
and provide an alternative means of delivering justice.   
1.4 Research objectives 
The main objectives of this thesis are; 
a) To identify the main factors that encourage States’ non-cooperation and their 
impacts on the court. 
b) To analyse the Rome Statute’s sanctioning power with a view to establish its 
effectiveness in responding to non-cooperation. 
c) To explore possible practical solutions that can be implemented within the Rome 
Statute to effectively address the non-cooperation by States. 
1.5 Research Questions 
This study will seek to answer four questions;  
1. What factors account for the high rate of non-compliance with requests for arrest 
and surrender in the ICC? 
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2. What powers of sanction are currently available to deal with non-cooperation? 
3. What amendments to the Rome Statute are necessary to strengthen States’ 
cooperation or mitigate the negative effects of non-cooperation? 
4. What other options exist, within and outside of public international law that might 
address the problem of States’ non-cooperation? 
1.6 Literature Review 
The lack of cooperation has been one of the greatest challenges facing the court.  The 
enforcement mechanism provided appears to have an inherent deficiency which has 
impacted the ability of the court to sanction States for non-cooperation. This review 
explores the various debates on the problem of non-cooperation. 
1.6.1 The centrality of States cooperation in the ICC.   
In “Non-cooperation and the efficiency of the International Criminal Court”10 Annika 
Jones contends that one of the most significant challenges that the ICC has faced since its 
creation has been securing State cooperation, the writer argues that “…. the failure of the 
State to cooperate has frustrated the court’s proceedings significantly.”  This argument is 
in line with the argument advanced in this thesis that the effect of non-cooperation on the 
ICC has been tremendous. The writer further examines the relationship between non-
cooperation and the efficiency of the ICC. The article examines the impact of the failure 
of States to cooperate with the court on the efficiency of its proceedings. It draws from the 
court’s investigations in Darfur, Sudan and Kenya to demonstrate the significant impact 
that lack of cooperation has had on the ability of the Court to seek justice for the crimes 
that fall within its jurisdiction.  
Further, the writer considers the potential for the inefficiency of ICC to conversely affect 
the willingness of States to cooperate with the court. The writer argues that the inefficiency 
of the court encourages non-cooperation from States that then in turn produces further 
                                                 
10 Jones A, Non-cooperation and the efficiency of the International Criminal Court in Bekou, O and 
Burke D (Eds) “Cooperation and the International Criminal Court perspectives from theory and practice” Brill 
Nijhoff, Leiden 2016.  
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inefficiency. The argument here is that the cycle must be addressed from within the ICC 
and its legislative and management body by taking measures to encourage efficiency in all 
aspects of the court’s operation especially in response to non-cooperation. This is distinct 
from the arguments by Banteka who argues on the importance of politics in the cooperation 
of States and proposes that the ICC needs to use its political role to increase its rates in the 
apprehension of suspects and secure higher levels of judicial enforcement.11 The author 
does not however, demonstrate how the court can use politics without compromising its 
judicial independence. 
In “The cooperation of States with the International Criminal Court”12 the authors argue 
that the success of the ICC is determined by the level of cooperation it receives from States. 
The ICC fully relies on States to arrest and surrender suspects having no police force of its 
own. Without such assistance it is faced with many challenges and difficulty in conducting 
proceedings. The writers argue that the key point in cooperation is the domestic legislation 
permitting the State party to co-operate when requested. The argument here fails to account 
for the non-cooperation by States that have enacted domestic legislation implementing the 
Statute. It is clear that enacting domestic legislation has not guaranteed cooperation. There 
are more fundamental factors underlying non-cooperation.  
James Meernik in his article “Conflicting Justice, Power and Peace Interests and the 
“Apprehension of ICC Suspects,” argues that the apprehension of suspects was the one 
absolutely most important thing that must be realized in order for the ICC to fulfill its 
mission to provide judicial accountability for violations of international humanitarian 
law.13 This argument is aligned with the main propositions and arguments of this thesis. 
                                                 
11 Banteka N, Mind the gap: a systematic approach to the International Criminal Court’s arrest 
warrants enforcement problem, 521. Cornell International Law Journal, 2016, 49. 
12 Oosterveld V, Perry M and McManus, The cooperation of states with the International Criminal 
Court, 25. Fordham International Law Journal 3, 2001, 18. 
13  Meernik J, Justice, Power and Peace: Conflicting Interests and the Apprehension of ICC Suspects. 
International Criminal Law Review 13, 2013, 169. 
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Cassese observed in Cassese’s International criminal law14 that State cooperation is 
crucial to the effectiveness of the judicial process of international criminal courts and that 
without cooperation the courts cannot operate.   
1.6.2 The enforcement problem 
In the International Criminal Court’s ineffective enforcement mechanisms: The indictment 
of President Omar Al Bashir15 Gwen Barnes argues that the ICC is ineffective due to the 
lack of enforcement mechanisms in the Rome Statute. The author analyses the refusal by 
Chad and Kenya to arrest Al Bashir and notes that the ICC is helpless in the face of such 
non-cooperation. The author links this apparent helplessness to the lack of clear 
repercussions for States that breach their obligations to cooperate and also to the lack of 
clarity in the provisions of the Rome Statute specifically Article 98(1) and (2) relating to 
immunity and excusal of a State party from obligations to cooperate due to other 
obligations. This is the position that is advanced in this thesis, that there is need for clear, 
concise consequences under the Statute for failure to cooperate, which ensures that States 
are fully aware of the repercussions for failing to cooperate.  
A similar argument is advanced by Ngolo in Analysing the future of international criminal 
justice in Africa, the author argues that the problem of the ICC is that it does not have the 
capacity to function without States cooperation and is powerless in the face of non-
cooperation. That it cannot do much to deal with non-cooperation. Further that the Rome 
Statute does not provide any action to be taken when a State fails to cooperate.16 
The author in Mind the gap: A systematic approach to the International Criminal Court’s 
arrest warrants enforcement problem17 contends that the ICC fails to procure substantial 
results due to its rejection to factor in politics. She argues on the importance of politics in 
the enforcement of arrest warrants and proposes that the ICC needs to use its political role 
                                                 
14 Cassese A, Gaeta P, Baig L, Fan M, Gosnell C and Whiting A, Cassese’s international criminal 
law,3, Oxford University Press, 2013, 298. 
15 Barnes G, The International Criminal Court’s ineffective enforcement mechanisms: the indictment 
of Omar Al Bashir, 34. Fordham International Law Journal 6, 2011, 47. 
16 Ngolo E.W, Analysing the future of international criminal justice in Africa: A focus on the ICC, 
Strathmore Law Review, 2016, 102-103. 
17 Banteka, Mind the gap, 49. 
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to increase its rates in the apprehension of suspects and secure higher levels of judicial 
enforcement. It is not clear how the factoring in of politics will ensure enforcement.  
1.6.3 Tackling States’ non-cooperation. 
The writers herein have made different arguments on how to deal with the question of non-
cooperation with the ICC. 
According to A. Jones, the way to address the issue of non-cooperation is through internal 
measures by the ICC within its legislative and management body to encourage efficiency 
in all aspects of the court’s operation especially in response to non-cooperation.18 
G. Barnes argues for the amendment of the Rome Statute to include defined repercussions 
for States that refuse to cooperate with the ICC’s requests. This is the argument that is 
advanced by this thesis, that to effectively deal with non-cooperation, there must be clearly 
defined consequences. The author proposes three options as repercussions which are 
suspension, expulsion and UNSC sanctions. According to the author repercussions faced 
will be determined by the severity of the breach by the State. This resonates well with the 
general ideas of this thesis. Further, the article proposes amendment of Article 98 to 
indicate what immunity and excusal constitute to deal with confusion surrounding the 
subject.19   
Banteka argues for the use of non-State actors and also the use of positive and negative 
incentives including inducements, reputational sanctions, travel bans and asset freezing as 
a way to increase compliance with arrest warrants.20 
1.6.4 The place of the study 
The above writers have all acknowledged that cooperation by States on the arrest and 
surrender of suspects is fundamental to the effective and successful functioning of the ICC. 
And further, that non-cooperation has been a contributing factor in the apparent 
ineffectiveness of the ICC. However, there is no consensus on the most effective approach 
                                                 
18 Jones, Non-cooperation and the efficiency of the International Criminal Court.  
19 Barnes, The International Criminal Court’s ineffective enforcement mechanisms,47. 




to be taken to deal with the non-cooperation; this is what this thesis seeks to address. This 
study seeks to join the ongoing debate on the problem of non-cooperation. The fact that 
non-cooperation is still a major challenge despite decades long debates on the subject 
means that it is an issue that has not been fully tackled. It remains a very live issue 
especially noting the very clear consequences still impacting the court. Therefore, the 
debates have not been exhausted and the court needs a practical solution if it is to survive. 
This thesis proposes the revision of the Rome Statute to provide for definite sanctions as a 
means of enforcing full compliance with requests for the arrest and surrender of suspects 
as well as to provide for trials in absentia as a measure of last resort when the presence of 
the accused cannot be obtained. 
1.7 Conceptual framework 
This thesis studies the factors that account for States’ non-cooperation in the ICC and also 
considers the ineffectiveness of the enforcement mechanism within the Rome Statute. It 
demonstrates that States’ cooperation is fundamental to the functioning of the ICC because 
States are the court’s enforcement arms in the arrest and surrender of suspects. States are 
therefore the central actors within the Rome Statute regime without which the ICC is 
handicapped.   
The Rome Statute establishes obligations for States parties to cooperate in the arrest and 
surrender of suspects. These obligations are binding on these States in international law by 
virtue of their ratification of the Statute. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, States are bound to perform their obligations under treaties that they are party to 
according to the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda.21 This means that ICC States parties have 
a duty to comply with their obligations under the Statute. While these obligations are 
binding, they present a conflict with the doctrine of State sovereignty.22 The independence 
of the court in the exercise of its judicial functions infringes on the sovereignty of States 
because traditionally, the exercise of criminal judicial jurisdiction is the monopoly of 
                                                 
21 Article 26 provides “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by 
them in good faith”  
22 Wind M, Challenging sovereignty? The USA and the establishment of the International Criminal 
Court, 2 Ethics and Global Politics Journal, 2009, 94. 
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States. Thus, the yielding of this power to the ICC curtails the sovereignty enjoyed by 
States. The obligations on cooperation and judicial assistance under the Rome Statute 
infringe on the exercise of national sovereignty, they require States to surrender sovereign 
power to the ICC.23 The court is therefore seen as assuming a superior position when States 
are bound to comply with its orders and requests.  
These doctrines are at the centre of the pull and push between the ICC and States on the 
question of non-cooperation. Although States have binding obligations under the Statute, 
they are reluctant to surrender the exercise of their sovereignty. States view the two 
principles as incompatible therefore resulting in the problem of non-cooperation.  
1.8 Approach and Methodology  
This study will be conducted through review of literature, this will be a qualitative analysis 
of primary and secondary sources of literature on the subject. The primary sources of 
literature for review herein will be the documents that form the law relating to State 
cooperation, these are the Rome Statute and the UN charter while the secondary sources 
will include books, journals and articles of scholars on the subject. 
1.9 Limitations and Assumptions 
This study will be limited entirely to the review of literature on the subject. It will also be 
faced by time constraints as it will be conducted within a limited period of time because it 
forms part of course work for the requirements for the award of the master of laws.  
There is an assumption that since State parties to the Rome Statute voluntarily joined and 
supported the establishment of the ICC, they would as a matter of cause be ready and 
willing to cooperate with it in all aspects. 
1.9.1 Chapter Breakdown 
This study will be organized into five chapters.  
Chapter 1 will contain the introduction to the study that will be further divided to cover 
problem statement, research objectives and questions, literature review, conceptual 
                                                 
23 Robert C, International criminal law vs sovereignty, European Journal of International Law, 2005, 985. 
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framework, approach and methodology, limitations and assumptions and chapter 
breakdown.  
Chapter 2 will examine the factors that account for the high rate of non-cooperation by 
States with the ICC.  
Chapter 3 will analyse the Rome Statute regime relating to non-cooperation and the reasons 
for its apparent ineffectiveness in dealing with States’ non-cooperation.  
Chapter 4 will examine the possible amendments to the Rome Statute to ensure cooperation 
and mitigate the effects of non-cooperation on the court.  


















An effective ICC: The Impact of States’ non-co-operation on arrest and surrender 
2.1 Introduction 
The ICC heavily depends on States in the discharge of its core mandate. State co-operation 
is paramount for the proper functioning of the court. On the flip side, it can thus be argued 
that States’ non-co-operation with the ICC hinders the proper functioning of the court. It 
therefore, has negative implications for the court. This chapter will deal with the factors 
accounting for non-co-operation and its impact on the effectiveness of the court. The first 
part will discuss what effectiveness of the ICC entails. The second part will deal with 
factors that influence the actions of States towards the ICC, basically factors encouraging 
non-co-operation. The last part will address the impact of non-co-operation on the 
effectiveness of the ICC. 
2.2 The question of effectiveness  
What constitutes an effective or successful ICC? This has been a subject of debate by 
scholars and commentators since the establishment of the court. There has, however, not 
been much consensus on the topic. This is mostly because there is no single standard of 
determining the ICC’s success, thereby making such an attempt a difficult exercise. To 
find a somewhat easier approach to this question, it is important to start with an 
understanding of the core objectives for which the court was established. Effectiveness or 
success would then constitute an achievement of these objectives by the court. The ICC 
was established for a number of ambitious objectives. The objectives are; to ensure that 
the common bonds of all peoples are not shattered, to recognise and ensure justice for the 
millions of people that have been victims of unimaginable atrocities, to bring to account 
all perpetrators of the most serious and atrocious crimes regardless of any official position 
held and to end the impunity of these perpetrators with an aim to deter the commission of 
these crimes.24 The ICC’s success is therefore an achievement of these very ambitious 
objectives. To achieve these objectives, the ICC heavily relies on State parties to assist in 
                                                 
24 Preamble to the Rome Statute. 
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carrying out some fundamental functions, which include arrest and surrender, taking of 
evidence, facilitating appearance of witnesses in the court, execution of searches and 
seizures, protection of victims and witnesses, enforcement of sentences among other forms 
of assistance.25   
As it has already been argued herein, co-operation by States is at the core of the ICC’s 
ability to effectively function. Without States the ICC has no capacity to carry out certain 
fundamental functions related to the discharge of its core mandate. Without the co-
operation of States in arrest and surrender of suspects, the court is rendered ineffective and 
unable to function. There are various factors that inform the actions or inaction of States 
towards the court in relation to arrest and surrender. The most notable factors are 
conflicting obligations and interests in international law faced by States in respect of the 
requests for arrest and surrender, domestic and international politics to which the court 
being a creature of a treaty ultimately finds itself in, lack of enforcement powers and 
accusations of bias in its choice of cases. According to Cherif Bassiouni the tenets of 
realism have an impact on States cooperation and that the greatest obstacle to the 
effectiveness of the ICC “will always be realpolitik and States interests”26  
2.3 Factors influencing States’ non-co-operation in arrest and surrender 
2.3.1 Conflicting obligations, interests and immunities 
Under Article 98 of the Rome Statute, the court may not proceed with a request for 
surrender or assistance that would make the requested State to act inconsistently with its 
obligations with respect to either its international law obligations relating to State or 
diplomatic immunity or its obligations under international agreements which prohibit the 
surrender of a person. The court must first obtain the consent of the third State before the 
requested State can comply with the ICC requests. This provision recognizes that States 
have obligations accruing under international law which at times might conflict with their 
obligations to the ICC. This provision can be interpreted to give States an opportunity to 
decline to assist the court when it is clear that in fulfilling such requests the State would be 
                                                 
25 Article 86, 87 and 93 of the Rome Statute. 
26 Bassouni M.C. The ICC-quo Vadis? 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice, (2006), 426. 
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acting inconsistently with its other obligations in international law. Although the Rome 
Statute expressly excludes official capacity as a basis for immunity from prosecution, it 
self contradicts by giving States an opportunity to decline to arrest or surrender a suspect 
to the court on the basis of other forms of immunity. This provision together with Article 
86 of the Rome Statute that provides a general yet limited obligation to cooperate, means 
that although there is a general obligation to cooperate the same can be limited in 
accordance to the statute. This gives States latitude in relation to co-operation and presents 
a very serious challenge to the court. It gives States a choice to decline to co-operate for 
this reason. Therefore, in the instance where a State has another obligation which is 
incompatible with the obligation in the Rome Statute, the State can rely on Article 98 of 
the Rome Statute. In essence other international obligations relating to immunity take 
precedence to those under the Rome Statute. The AU relied on Article 98 in passing the 
resolution during its 13th Summit on 6th July 2009 persuading member States not to co-
operate with the ICC on the arrest of Omar al Bashir.27 Some African States28 party to the 
Rome Statute have relied on this declaration of the AU in declining to co-operate with the 
ICC in the arrest and surrender of Al Bashir whilst he was within their territories. Under 
Article 27 of the Rome Statute there is no immunity for Heads of states. However, under 
customary international law, Al Bashir enjoys full immunity from arrest in foreign 
countries.  
Under customary international law, States would be faced with incompatible obligations 
under which they can be excused from co-operating under Article 98. Therefore, the duty 
to arrest Al Bashir in this circumstance puts these States’ interests at loggerhead with their 
obligations under the statute. The States’ foreign policy and economic interests with Sudan 
and other members of the AU are at stake. Relying on principles of realism in international 
relations, these States chose to pursue their own interests not the interests of international 
criminal justice.29 
                                                 
27 Decisions and declarations of the assembly of the African Union thirteenth ordinary session. 
28 Chad, Kenya, Djibouti, Malawi and South Africa. 
29 Ali N, Bringing the guilty to justice: can the ICC be self-enforcing, 14 Chicago journal of international 
law 2, (2014), 417. 
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Article 98 of the Rome Statute also envisions agreements between States under which 
States may be prohibited from surrender of suspects to the court. The United States of 
America (USA) has used this provision to enter into bilateral agreements with various 
States that are parties to the Rome Statute with an aim to shield its citizens from the ICC’s 
jurisdiction. These agreements ensure that these States do not surrender American citizens 
to the ICC.30 These agreements create conflicting obligations for States that have 
obligations under the Rome Statute, as such States can decline to co-operate with the ICC 
requests on the basis of such agreements.     
2.3.2 Domestic and international politics  
The ICC has constantly presented itself as an institution that is outside the political realm. 
The former Chief Prosecutor had in relation to this stated that he applies the law without 
political considerations.31 The current Chief Prosecutor has similarly echoed her 
predecessor in this assertion that the court is not guided by politics. She argues that ICC 
justice is guided solely by the law and evidence.32While the court itself purports to be 
apolitical and not involved in any politics, it is, naturally-owing to its nature-tangled with 
politics. It is a political creature and therefore it cannot run away from the consequent 
politics. It fundamentally relies on States co-operation to function; States are inherently 
political entities thus all actions in relation to the ICC are politically motivated in one way 
or the other. Therefore, the ICC finds itself caught up in this politics. There are instances 
that demonstrate the politics that comes into play in the relationship between the court and 
states. 
In 2003 the president of Uganda referred the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC. 
This was after a decade and a half of war between the Ugandan army and the LRA. By 
many this move was viewed as the government’s attempt to defeat its long-standing 
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International criminal justice in Africa 2017, Strathmore University Press, Nairobi, 2018, 160. 
31 ‘Keynote address Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 
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military enemy through non-military means. This referral was therefore a political move 
that had nothing to do with the quest for justice for victims. The prosecutor in pursuing the 
Ugandan referral conducted investigations into the situation and subsequently indicted the 
top commanders of the LRA, this was in spite of the wide spread atrocities that were also 
committed by the Ugandan armed forces. In choosing which cases to pursue in Uganda the 
Prosecutor had taken political considerations,33 by choosing not to investigate and 
prosecute the crimes of the Ugandan forces, the prosecutor was interested in ensuring full 
co-operation of the Ugandan government.34 In doing so the prosecutor recognised the 
implication of indicting the Ugandan army and the consequences it would have on his 
ability to conduct investigations within the region, there would have been outright 
resistance by the Ugandan government and any form of co-operation would be impossible. 
The prosecutor therefore played right into the political machinations surrounding that 
referral. The Ugandan government’s co-operation with the court was solely influenced by 
political consideration. The Ugandan president has since taken up an active role in the AU 
campaign against the ICC. Nadia Banteka has argued that the ICC as an actor within the 
international landscape makes many decisions that are inevitably political.35 This 
demonstrates how politics influences States in their actions towards the ICC as well as the 
ICC’s approach to situations. 
The actions of African States in refusing to arrest Al Bashir demonstrate the impact that 
the politics within the AU has had on the response of States to the ICC. The actions are 
informed by regional political considerations. As discussed earlier on in this chapter, the 
AU has engaged in a campaign against the ICC as solely focusing on Africa ignoring other 
international crimes occurring in conflicts outside the continent. It passed a resolution 
directing members not to co-operate with the requests for the arrest of Al Bashir.36 The 
AU’s argument is a political denunciation of the ICC as a political tool of the 
                                                 
33 Clark J.N Peace, justice and the International Criminal Court; limitations and possibilities, 9 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, (2011), 527. 
34 Nouwen S.M.H and Werner W.G Doing justice to the political: The International Criminal Court 
in Uganda and Sudan, 21 The European Journal of International Law, (2010), 950. 
35 Banteka, Mind the gap, 531.  
36 Decisions and declarations of the assembly of the African Union thirteenth ordinary session. 
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west.37African States have been guided by the directives of the AU in so far as their 
reaction to the Al Bashir warrants are concerned.38 This demonstrates that the ICC is 
inevitably in one way or another affected by political considerations of States.   
The UNSC referrals of the Sudan and Libya39 situations are a reflection of politics; referrals 
are political tools used by the Security Council as and when it suits its own interests. The 
fact that it is now thirteen years since the Security Council made the referral of the Darfur 
situation40 and there has been no progress made by the ICC with regard to the case shows 
the lack of political interest and will by the Security Council to pursue justice for the 
victims. This is also the position in relation to the Libyan situation. In 2011 the UNSC 
referred the situation in Libya to the ICC. Warrants of arrest were issued thereafter in 
march by the pre-trial chamber against three accused persons namely Muammar Gaddafi, 
Abdullah Al Senussi and Saif Al Islam. The warrants against Gaddafi were withdrawn 
following his death in November 2011. The proceedings against Al Senussi came to an 
end on 24th July 2014 when the Appeals chamber confirmed the decision of the pre-trial 
chamber declaring the case inadmissible before the ICC.41 Al Islam was subsequently 
captured in December 2011 by Libyan forces. The ICC prosecutor made a request to the 
Libyan government to surrender him to the ICC. The government argued that he should be 
tried in Libya therefore challenged the admissibility of the case before the ICC, the case 
was held to be admissible by the court. Two subsequent warrants of arrest were issued 
against Mohamed Khaled and Mahmoud Al Werfali.42 To date none of the accused persons 
have been handed over by the Libyan government to the ICC and their cases remain at the 
pre-trial stage. The ICC referred the non-co-operation by the Libyan government to the 
UNSC but there was no effort by the council to enforce co-operation.43 The Chief 
                                                 
37 Cole R J V, Africa’s relationship with the International Criminal Court: more political than legal, 
14 Melbourne Journal of International Law, 2013, 12. 
38 Chad, Kenya, Djibouti, Malawi and South Africa 
39 UNSC Resolution 1593 (31 March 2005) and UNSC resolution 1970, 26 February 2011. 
40 Situation referred to the ICC by the UNSC in March 2005. 
41 ICC situations and cases, https://www.icc-cpi.int/libya 22 December 2018. 
42ICC situations and cases, https://www.icc-cpi.int/libya 22 December 2018. 
43 Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi Case: ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I issues non-compliance finding for Libyan 
Government and refers matter to UN Security Council https://www.icc-
cpi.int/pages/item.aspx?name=PR1074 22 December 2018. 
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Prosecutor has since this referral acknowledged the co-operation she has received from the 
Libyan government in her investigations in Libya.44 With regard to the Darfur case, Fatou 
Bensouda has blamed the Security Council for not taking any concrete action to help the 
ICC in Darfur.45 The attitude of the Security Council has had an impact on the actions of 
States. The lack of commitment and action by the council in spite of the authority it has 
under chapter VII of the UN Charter to compel co-operation has greatly undermined the 
ICC’s efforts for co-operation by Sudan and other States.   
2.3.3 Lack of enforcement powers     
The lack of enforcement agencies and powers by the ICC is one of the challenges that 
affect the ability of the court to achieve its institutional goal and to the furtherance of 
international criminal justice.46 The ICC does not have enforcement powers in relation to 
its requests and orders, it also lacks powers to enforce or compel co-operation by States. 
This framework makes the court entirely powerless in the face of non-co-operation, it can 
only be strengthened by the support of States. Under Article 87 (5) and (7) of the Rome 
Statute, the court can make a finding of non-cooperation by a State upon which the court 
informs the ASP or the UNSC of the said non-co-operation. There is no provision 
indicating what action these bodies should take upon being informed of the non-co-
operation. Article 112(8) provides that the ASP shall consider pursuant to Article 87 
paragraph 5 and 7 any question relating to non-co-operation. There is no express 
provision as to what happens after such consideration. The pre-trial chamber has made 
                                                 
44 Thirteenth report of the prosecutor of the ICC to the UNSC pursuant to resolution 1970, 8th May 
2017. 
45 UNSC 69th year, 7337th meeting, Friday 12 December 2014, New York, S/PV.7337.  
46 Ali, Bringing the guilty to justice, 417. 
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several findings of non-co-operation by Chad,47 Kenya,48 Djibouti,49 Malawi,50 the DRC51 
and South Africa52 in relation to non-co-operation on the arrest of Al Bashir. All the States 
above are parties to the Rome Statute and have an obligation to co-operate under the 
Statute.53 The Rome Statute has no mechanism or power to compel these States to co-
operate other than to rely on the UNSC and ASP. The ICC has made referral in relation to 
the stated non-co-operation to the ASP and UNSC.54 Despite these referrals by the court 
to both the UNSC and the ASP, there has been no concrete action taken to compel or 
sanction these States for their failure to co-operate. There is no clear mechanism either in 
the Rome Statute or established by the UNSC and ASP to compel States to comply with 
their obligations and further there is no clear consequence to be suffered by the non-
complying State.55 This has greatly frustrated the efforts of the court and has basically 
                                                 
47 ICC, prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir decision informing the United Nations Security 
Council and the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute about the Omar al Bashir recent visit 
to the Republic of Chad, ICC-02/05-01/09-109, 27 August 2010. 
48 ICC, prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir decision informing the United Nations Security 
Council and the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute about Omar Al Bashir presence in the 
territory of the Republic of Kenya, ICC-02/05-01/09-107, 27 August 2010. 
49 ICC, prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir decision informing the United Nations Security 
Council and the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute about Omar Al Bashir recent visit to 
Djibouti, ICC-02/05-01/09-129, 12 May 2011. 
50 ICC, prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir corrigendum to the decision pursuant to Article 87(7) 
of the Rome Statute on the failure by the Republic of Malawi to comply with the co-operation 
requests issued by the court with respect to the arrest and surrender of Omar Hassan Al Bashir, ICC-
02/05-01/09-139-corr, 13 December 2011. 
51 ICC, prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir decision on the co-operation of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo regarding Omar Al Bashir arrest and surrender to the court, ICC-02/05-01/09-
195, 9 April 2014. 
52 ICC, prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir decision under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on 
the non-compliance by South Africa with the request by the court for the arrest and surrender of 
Omar Al Bashir arrest, ICC-02/05-01/09, 6 July 2017. 
53ASP, member states https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/african%20states/Pages/african%20states.aspx. 
54 ASP Report of the Bureau on non-co-operation of Malawi and Chad, November 2012 
https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP11/ICC-ASP-11-29-ENG.pdf, ASP Report of the 
Bureau on non-co-operation of Chad and Nigeria, November 2013  https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP12/ICC-ASP-12-34-ENG.pdf, ASP Report of the Bureau on non-co-
operation of Chad, Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of Congo, December 2014 
https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP13/ICC-ASP-13-40-ENG.pdf, ASP Report of the 
Bureau on non-co-operation of South Africa, Libya and Sudan, November 2015 https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP14/ICC-ASP-14-38-ENG.pdf,  ASP Report of the Bureau on non-co-
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55 Article 112(8) of the Rome Statute. 
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hindered any progress on the case. Therefore, the success of the ICC in this case will 
depend on the enforcement by the UNSC and ASP in relation to the requests for co-
operation in investigations, arrest and surrender of the accused.     
2.3.4 Choice of cases: perceptions of bias   
African States were at the forefront in supporting the establishment of the ICC, in 1998 
African countries adopted the Dakar Declaration56  in support of the establishment of the 
International Criminal Court and subsequently a high number of African States ratified the 
Rome Statute and currently Africa has the largest block of membership of the ASP at 33 
after the recent withdrawal of Burundi.57  However, over the years this support has turned 
to great antagonism towards the court. All the twenty-seven active cases58 currently before 
the ICC and situations referred to it by the UNSC are from Africa.59 There are several 
situations under preliminary examinations that are outside of Africa.60 This fact 
notwithstanding, there is still perception that the court has not actively pursued cases from 
outside of the continent. This has greatly influenced the perception within African States 
that the court is biased.61 This has led to serious hostility of the AU towards the ICC, this 
deteriorated further with the court’s issuance of an arrest warrant for president Omar Al 
Bashir.62 Following this warrant of arrest, the AU requested the UNSC to suspend the 
warrant to enable negotiation of a peace agreement in Darfur, the UNSC did not respond 
to this request.63 This further fueled the assertion that the ICC is a tool of neo-colonialism 
by powerful western States that are permanent members of the UNSC. African States have 
                                                 
56 Dakar declaration for the establishment of the International Criminal Court in 1998. 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/DakarDeclarationFeb98Eng.pdf on 22 December 2018. 
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questioned the integrity of the ICC in so far as it does not demand the same accountability 
from western leaders as it does of African leaders. This perception has further been 
compounded by the UNSC non-referral of other conflict situations outside of Africa like 
Israel, Iraq and Syria. This perception has fueled criticism that by only focusing on Africa, 
the ICC has not lived up to the universal aspirations for which it was established. 
2.4 Impact of States’ non-co-operation    
As discussed above the ICC has faced a considerable level of non-co-operation from States 
that have an obligation to co-operate by virtue of their ratification of the Rome Statute. The 
non-co-operation has had an impact on the court’s ability to discharge its mandate. The 
non-co-operation herein has resulted in the ICC’s inability to proceed with the trial against 
Al Bashir and the other accused persons in the Darfur case. The case was referred in 2005, 
it is now thirteen years later and there has been no progress made in relation to the cases 
and the violence in Darfur has not stopped. The Prosecutor has not been able to carry out 
investigations in Darfur and it looks like there is no chance of that position changing any 
time soon. This has led to delay in prosecution of the accused persons and in effect in 
bringing the perpetrators to justice and giving justice to the victims. It has been argued that 
this inability to arrest suspects undermines the international justice system and frustrates 
cases while denying justice to the victims of these crimes.64 The Prosecutor has 
consequently had to suspend the investigations in Darfur, Stuart Ford notes that the 
decision of the Prosecutor to suspend investigations is an admission that the success of the 
ICC in Darfur is almost entirely out of its hands.65 
Lack of co-operation has generated delay in the proceedings of the court, this has resulted 
in higher operational costs. The court has so far dedicated time and resources towards the 
investigations and cases while the accused still remain at large. This means that the cases 
are dormant while the court remains in a state of inactivity as it awaits the arrest and 
surrender of the accused persons. Anika Jones argues that the non-co-operation in the 
                                                 
64 Roper S.D and Barria L.A, State cooperation and international criminal court bargaining influence 
in the arrest and surrender of suspects, 21 Leiden Journal of International Law, 2008, 458. 
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Darfur cases has had an obvious impact on the efficiency of the court, time and resources 
have been invested in the investigations which cannot proceed to trial without the arrest 
and surrender of the accused. This has contributed to an increased sense of frustration with 
the slow pace of justice at the ICC and the low number of cases the court has completed.66 
This non-co-operation as demonstrated has had an effect on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the court by increasing the period of time the investigations and the cases 
have taken and resulting in some inactivity at the court. 
The lack of enforcement mechanisms and powers to compel or sanction States for non-co-
operation has further encouraged and emboldened States not to co-operate. The number of 
States that have been able to get away with non-co-operation without any consequence 
contributes to more instances of non-co-operation by States. The lack of clear and concrete 
consequences and sanctions for non-co-operation encourages States to act in their interests. 
Anika Jones in this regard notes that inefficiency of the court could have a negative impact 
on the willingness of States to co-operate.67 The lack of enforcement capacity is one of the 
threats to the ability of the court to achieve its fundamental mandate, it thus renders the 
ICC highly ineffective and generally at the mercy of States that are driven by their own 
interests and rarely act inconsistently with their interests.68       
As demonstrated herein the ICC’s effectiveness depends on States co-operation in arrest 
and surrender. Without the accused persons before the court, the court cannot proceed with 
trials. It is therefore clear that when States fail to arrest and surrender accused persons, the 
court cannot function. The failure to arrest and surrender accused persons is therefore 
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THE ROME STATUTE ENFORCEMENT FRAMEWORK ON NON-
COOPERATION: IS IT SUFFICIENT? 
3.1 Introduction 
States’ cooperation in arrest and surrender as demonstrated in the preceding chapter is 
fundamental to the functioning of the ICC. This is particularly important because the court 
cannot proceed in the absence of the accused person. The presence of the accused is 
mandatory for the trial, Article 63(1) of the Rome Statute provides “The accused shall be 
present during the trial.” Accordingly, the court can only proceed when an accused person 
has been presented before it. Thus, the failure to arrest persons wanted before the court has 
a crippling effect on the court’s proceedings.  
This chapter seeks to analyse the enforcement framework towards non-cooperation in 
arrest and surrender within the Rome Statute. The Statute contains provisions that deal 
with how the court responds to the issue of non-cooperation with its requests and orders, 
which will be outlined first in paragraph nine to eleven of the chapter. The chapter then 
seeks to establish whether these provisions are adequate to sufficiently deal with the issue 
of non-cooperation.  
3.2 Mechanism for States’ cooperation in arrest and surrender within the Rome 
Statute 
Part 9 of the Rome Statute contains provisions relating to international cooperation and 
judicial assistance. It contains elaborate provisions on how State parties are to cooperate 
and assist the court in its requests and orders. The provisions essentially establish an 
elaborate mechanism that is aimed at ensuring that States have all the necessary tools to 
achieve cooperation with the court.   The Statute also establishes a general obligation for 
State parties to cooperate with the court in accordance with the provisions of the Statute.69  
                                                 
69 Article 86 Rome Statute. 
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On the subject of arrest and surrender, article 58(1) of the Rome Statute provides for the 
issuance of a warrant of arrest by the Pre-Trial Chamber on the application of the 
Prosecutor and upon satisfying itself that there are sufficient grounds to issue the said 
warrant. Upon the issuance of the warrant, the court is authorized to transmit a request 
accompanied by all the supporting materials for the arrest and surrender of the person to 
the State in whose territory the person may be found.70 The requests are transmitted through 
diplomatic or any other channel designated by the State in question. 
A State party that has received a request for arrest and surrender must immediately take 
steps to arrest and surrender the person.71 It should take such steps in accordance with its 
national laws and the provisions of part 9 of the Statute. Arrest is essentially undertaken 
through national laws; States must therefore have national procedures to be able to give 
effect to the requests for arrest. Cooperation in arrest and surrender within the Statute also 
entails the enactment of national laws and procedures to enable the implementation of the 
requests and orders of the court.72 Upon arrest, the person must be promptly brought before 
a competent court to determine that the person arrested is the one sought, that the arrest 
was in accordance with the law and that the rights of the person have been respected. The 
court will also determine questions of interim release and any application on the principle 
of ne bis in idem. Such determinations will be made in consultation with the ICC. The State 
will then surrender the person to the ICC as soon as possible. The use of national 
procedures for this process underscores the centrality of State cooperation for the 
functioning of the court. It further shows that in the absence of cooperation from the State, 
the ICC has no other way of arresting an accused person. There is no provision that gives 
authority or a mechanism for the court to directly execute the warrants of arrest.  
In a case where the State receives competing requests from the ICC and another State 
relating to the same person over the same conduct, the State receiving the requests must 
give priority to the ICC request.73 The exception to this priority is where the requested 
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71 Article 59(1) Rome Statute. 
72 Article 88 Rome Statute. 
73 Article 90(2) Rome Statute 
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State has an existing international obligation to extradite to the other State not a State party 
to the Rome Statute. This makes the obligation to the ICC secondary. However, the State 
must take into account all relevant factors in determining whether to surrender the person 
to the ICC or extradite to the other State.74 The Statute also provides for consultation 
between the court and the State where there are problems encountered by the State which 
may prevent the execution of the request.75 
The State is obligated under the Statute to take steps to fully cooperate to give effect to the 
request by the court. The obligation to comply with these requests is set out by article 86 
and extended by 89. The State therefore must fully cooperate with the request but at the 
same time has a leeway not to cooperate as discussed above. 
The procedure for arrest and surrender is clear, elaborate and would in practice be easy to 
implement. However, States have not been forthcoming with cooperation which has had a 
negative effect on the work of the court. The Statute provides recourse for the court in 
instances where a State fails to comply with a request from the court.   
3.3 Rome Statute procedure on States’ non-cooperation 
The Rome Statute establishes an obligation for States to cooperate with the court on its 
requests and orders. Where a State party fails to cooperate with a request by the court, the 
court may make a judicial finding of non-cooperation and refer the matter to the Assembly 
of States Parties or the Security Council in cases where it had referred the matter to the 
court.76 This is the only recourse available to the court under the Statute. The court makes 
a finding to that effect pursuant to an application for a finding of non-cooperation under 
article 87(7) by the prosecution within which the State in question may be called upon to 
respond to the application. When the court is satisfied that the State in question has failed 
to cooperate with the request of the court, it may make a finding of non-cooperation and 
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may refer the matter to the ASP or UNSC as envisaged under 87(7). The Statute has no 
provision for the court to directly compel or sanction the State for the non-cooperation, it 
only allows for a finding of non-cooperation. The finding of non-cooperation is a 
requirement that must be met before a referral is made. When the court makes a referral, it 
has no authority over how the ASP and Security Council respond. 
The Statute does not set out any consequence that is to be suffered by the State for its non-
cooperation. As currently constituted, there are no defined repercussions for non-
cooperation other than a finding of non-cooperation. Further, the Statute does not have 
provision on the action that is to be taken by the ASP and Security Council when a referral 
is made.  
The lack of clear and defined consequences for non-cooperation within the Rome Statute 
makes the entire enforcement regime weak and unenforceable. The lack of clear 
consequences makes the enforcement by the ASP and Security Council uncertain. This 
uncertainty gives them the liberty to choose whether to take action and what action to take. 
This creates a schism between the court and its enforcement arms in the sense that a judicial 
pronouncement of non-cooperation will not always attract the same consequence or any 
consequence at all. Further, the court has no control over the enforcement of its findings. 
This is because it has no powers to direct the two bodies in any way on how to respond to 
its findings of non-cooperation.   
This gap illustrates the inherent weakness in the enforcement regime that has exposed the 
court to instances of willful and direct non-cooperation by States. The lack of clearly 
defined consequences has encouraged non-cooperation by States.   
3.4 ASP procedure on non-cooperation 
Article 112 of the Statute establishes the ASP77 with a mandate to, among others, consider 
any question relating to non-cooperation.78 Further Article 112(9) mandates the Assembly 
to adopt its own rules of procedure. The Assembly and the Bureau have been actively 
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engaged in activities relating to non-cooperation with an aim to enhancing the ability of 
the Assembly to deal with issues relating to non-cooperation.79 The Assembly in this regard 
during its tenth session in 2010 under resolution 5 adopted the Assembly procedures 
relating to non-cooperation. The procedures were formulated by the Assembly’s Bureau 
following a request by the Assembly during its ninth session.80 The basis for the procedures 
was the recognition of the negative impact that non-cooperation on the court’s requests can 
have on the ability of the court to execute its mandate. The procedures are aimed at 
strengthening the Assembly’s mandate on issues relating to non-cooperation.  
Under the procedures, non-cooperation is to be understood as the failure by a State party 
or a State which has entered into an ad hoc agreement with the court to comply with a 
specific request for cooperation from the court. The State party herein must have 
implemented the Rome Statute domestically in a manner as to be able to comply with the 
request.81  
The procedures set out two scenarios where the Assembly may take action. Firstly, where 
the court has referred a non-cooperation matter to the Assembly and secondly where there 
is no referral but the Assembly has reasons to believe that a specific and serious incident 
of non-cooperation in respect of a request for arrest and surrender of a person is about to 
occur or ongoing and urgent action by the Assembly may help bring cooperation.82 The 
two scenarios require different procedures to be adopted. There are formal and informal 
procedures used to respond to the scenarios.83  
The referral by the court which constitutes the first scenario requires a formal procedure 
by the Assembly. The formal procedures involve successive steps to be taken by the Bureau 
and the Assembly. The formal procedures are outlined in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the 
procedures. The steps to be taken include emergency Bureau meeting where an oral report 
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from the president on the action taken and to further decide on what further action would 
be required. The next step entails an open letter from the president to the State concerned 
reminding it of its obligation to cooperate and requesting its views on the matter within a 
period not more than two weeks. The president may send a copy of the letter to all State 
parties encouraging them to raise the matter in bilateral contacts with the state in question. 
The Bureau can then hold a meeting at the expiry of the time limit or at the receipt of a 
response from the State. A representative of the State presents its views on how to 
cooperate with the court in future. A public meeting could then be held to allow for open 
dialogue with the State and other interested States and organizations. The Bureau may then 
submit its report to the Assembly including recommendation as to whether the matter 
requires action by the Assembly. The report could then be discussed at the plenary session 
of the Assembly and where necessary, the Bureau will appoint a facilitator to consult on a 
draft resolution containing concrete recommendations.84  
The second scenario outlined in paragraph 15,16,17,18 and 19 of the procedures would get 
an informal response at the diplomatic and political levels. The informal procedures 
include the appointment by the Bureau of four or five regional focal points to assist the 
president in this regard. Informal contact by the president with State officials of the State 
in question and other stakeholders would take place for the purpose of raising awareness 
of the issue and to promote full cooperation. The president would then make an oral report 
to the Bureau immediately after such interactions and as maybe decided the president may 
continue undertaking the informal interactions.85  
In relation to the informal procedures, the Bureau through the focal points developed a 
toolkit for the implementation of the informal procedures.86 It is a resource for States 
parties to improve the implementation of the informal procedures on non-cooperation. It 
                                                 
84 Assembly procedures relating to non-cooperation, para 14 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f). 
85 Assembly procedures relating to non-cooperation, para 19 and 20. 
86 Assembly of States Parties, report of the Bureau on non-cooperation, toolkit for the implementation 
of the informal dimension of the Assembly procedures relating to non-cooperation, ICC-
ASP/15/31/Add.1, 9 November 2016. 
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contains resources in which States parties may draw upon to encourage States to cooperate 
in relation to arrest and surrender of persons subject to a warrant of arrest.87 
The toolkit is meant to encourage States to cooperate with the court and to be able to reach 
out in time for sensitive situations to ensure the arrest and surrender of suspects. It intends 
to have a standardized response to potential instances of non-cooperation. The toolkit 
contains various actions that can be undertaken by States to encourage cooperation. They 
include monitoring the travel of persons subject to warrants of arrest through diplomatic 
networks, google alerts, sharing information with the court, States parties and civil society. 
It also contains templates for States to use to encourage cooperation and prevent instances 
of non-cooperation.  
3.5 The Security Council response to non-cooperation 
The United Nations and the ICC entered into a relationship agreement which sets out the 
relationship between the two institutions.88 Article 3 of the agreement establishes an 
obligation of cooperation and coordination between the two institutions on matters of 
mutual interest.89Article 17 specifically refers to the cooperation between the Security 
Council and the Court. Under this article the Security Council has powers to refer situations 
where crimes within the jurisdiction of the court have been committed. Article 17(3) 
empowers the court to make a referral for non-cooperation in a situation referred by the 
Security Council.  
The agreement does not establish a response mechanism for the Security Council when a 
referral for non-cooperation is made. The Security Council has not established its own 
procedure for responding to the referrals by the court. Therefore, there is no structured and 
                                                 
87 Toolkit for the implementation of the informal dimension of the Assembly procedures relating to 
non-cooperation, ICC-ASP/15/31/Add.1, 9 November 2016, para 1. 
88 Negotiated relationship agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United 
Nations. 
89 Article 3 states “the United Nations and Court agree that with a view to facilitating the effective 
discharge of their respective responsibilities, they shall cooperate closely, whenever appropriate, with 
each other and consult each other on matters of mutual interest pursuant to the provisions of the 
present agreement and in conformity with the respective provisions of the Charter and the Statute.” 
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defined way for the Security Council to respond and enforce findings of non-cooperation 
referred to it by the court.  
3.6 A critique of the non-cooperation framework 
The ICC has no enforcement mechanism for arrest and surrender. It is fully reliant on States 
to perform this important function. In the event that States fail to cooperate in this regard 
the Rome Statute provides a mechanism that the court can use in response. 
The Statute provides that when a State fails to cooperate with a request from the court, the 
court may make a finding of non-cooperation and refer the matter to the ASP or the 
Security Council as the case maybe. This is the only response available to the court in the 
face of non-cooperation. This response is inadequate for various reasons that will be 
discussed herein. 
The fact that the only avenue available for the court is to make a finding of non-cooperation 
leaves the court powerless, without a means of directly sanctioning a State for non-
cooperation. The lack of power to enforce its judicial decision makes the court very weak 
and reliant on a long and indirect way through the ASP and Security Council with unlikely 
tangible results.90 The lack of a mechanism in which the court enforces its finding on non-
cooperation displays a weak court incapable of exercising basic judicial powers. The court 
has to rely on the two bodies over which it has no power to direct on the course of action 
to take in reference to its referral. The enforcement system creates an incomplete 
mechanism for the court as it has no way of ensuring action by either the ASP or the 
Security Council. It has no authority to follow up with the ASP and Security Council to 
ensure that there has been decisive action taken to deal with the non-cooperation.  
The ASP procedure is aimed at strengthening the assembly’s ability to respond to the non-
cooperation referred to it. The procedures are non-judicial in nature. The formal procedures 
are not compelling on States in any way; the wording of the procedures demonstrates that 
States are not obliged to cooperate with the assembly in the process. The president of the 
bureau sends an open letter to the State in question reminding it of its obligation under the 
                                                 
90 Banteka, Mind the gap, 528. 
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Statute to cooperate and request its views on the matter. The language used in the 
procedures suggests that States are not obliged to respond to the letter by the president of 
the bureau. There is no sense of obligation despite the fact that the court made a finding 
that the State in question is in breach of its obligation under the Statute. The letter itself is 
not coercive, it only reminds the State of its obligation and requests the views of the State 
on the matter. A State may fail or decline to respond to the letter without any consequence. 
The procedures need to have an element and sense of authority and compulsion with some 
kind of force of law to make them more authoritative. 
During the envisaged meeting of the Bureau with a representative of the State, the 
representative is only required to present views on how the State would cooperate in the 
future. There is no provision of having the State sanctioned or even required to explain 
why it failed to cooperate leading to the finding and referral. It creates a sense that States 
can get away with non-cooperation without any consequences. It is important to have 
consequences that follow non-cooperation because the lack of consequences makes it 
easier for States not to cooperate.  
The procedures also envisage a report being made to the assembly with a possibility of the 
report being discussed at the plenary of the Assembly. Subsequent to this plenary 
discussion there is no indication of the next concrete step that can be taken by the assembly 
when the attempts at addressing the non-cooperation are futile. The procedures are vague 
as to what happens when all the steps have been concluded and the State still fails to 
comply. 
The ASP procedures appear to be insufficient and incapable of decisively addressing non-
cooperation. They are aimed at persuading States but have no force of compelling 
cooperation. They are also not clear as to what will happen when all the steps have been 
exhausted and the State fails to comply with the request of the court. The procedures entail 
mostly diplomatic activities which are insufficient to enforce the court’s finding. 
In practice these procedures have proved to be ineffective, the court to date still faces non-
cooperation and the ASP has not been able to cure or obtain cooperation in the cases 
referred to it. A review of the cases referred to the ASP for non-cooperation indicates that 
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the ASP has largely been ineffective in enforcing States cooperation with the court. On 
27th August 2010, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I referred Chad and Kenya to the Security 
Council and ASP for non-cooperation in arresting Omar Al Bashir when he visited the two 
countries.91 On 12th May 2011, the Pre-Trial Chamber I referred Djibouti to the Security 
Council and ASP for non-cooperation in the arrest of Al Bashir when he visited the 
country.92 On 11th July 2016 the Pre-Trial Chamber II referred Uganda to the Security 
Council and the ASP for non-cooperation in the arrest and surrender of Al Bashir when he 
visited the country.93    
The ASP has responded to the referrals made to it through the Bureau. In its reports, the 
Bureau details some of the actions undertaken in response to the non-cooperation. The 
Bureau’s reports from 2012 to 2016 detail the engagements between the Bureau and States 
parties in relation to the non-cooperation referrals by the court.94 Despite the engagements 
by the ASP, non-cooperation by States has persisted over the years involving States parties 
and non-State parties. 
The Security Council has not been as engaged as the ASP in response to the referrals made 
to it. The ICC Prosecutor in one of her briefings to the Security Council indicated that her 
briefings on the situation in Darfur have been followed by inaction and paralysis within 
the Council.95 While explaining the decision to put the Darfur investigations on hold, the 
Prosecutor explained that in almost ten years of reporting, there has been no action or 
                                                 
91 Prosecutor v Omar Al Bashir, Decision informing the United Nations Security Council and the 
Assembly of States Parties of the Rome Statute about Omar Al Bashir recent visit to the Republic of 
Chad, ICC-02/05-01/09, 27 August 2010, Decision informing the United Nations Security Council 
and the Assembly of States Parties of the Rome Statute about Omar Al Bashir presence in the 
territory of the Republic of Kenya, ICC-02/05-01/09, 27 August 2010. 
92 Prosecutor v Omar Al Bashir, Decision informing the United Nations Security Council and the 
Assembly of States Parties of the Rome Statute about Omar Al Bashir’s recent visit to Djibouti, ICC-
02/05-01/09, 12 May 2011. 
93 Prosecutor v Omar Al Bashir, Decision on the non-compliance by the Republic of Uganda with the 
arrest and surrender of Omar Al Bashir to the court and referring the matter to the United Nations 
Security Council and the Assembly of States Parties of the Rome Statute, ICC-02/05-01/09, 11 July 
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94 Report of the Bureau on non-cooperation, ICC-ASP/11/29, 1 November 2012, ICC-ASP/12/34, 7 
November 2013, ICC-ASP/13/40, 5 December 2014, ICC-ASP/14/38, 18 November 2015, ICC-
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95 UN Security Council, 6974th meeting, 5 June 2013, S/PV.6974. 
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engagement by the Council to solve the non-cooperation problem in the Darfur situation.96 
The ICC has referred several states to the Security Council for non-cooperation in the 
Darfur and Libya situations that it referred to the court. These are Sudan, Chad, Kenya, 
Djibouti, Malawi, Democratic Republic of Congo and Libya.97 During the twenty third 
briefing on the Darfur situation, the Prosecutor lamented at the conspicuous silence and 
inaction by the Council which has had negative impacts on the progress of the cases.98 The 
Security Council has not made much effort to respond to the referrals in spite of regular 
briefing by the Prosecutor on the status of the cases and in total disregard of the agreement 
between the ICC and the United Nations of which the Security Council is an organ. Article 
3 of that agreement provides an obligation for the two bodies to cooperate on matters of 
mutual interest to facilitate the effective discharge of their respective responsibilities.99 
3.7 Conclusion 
It is very clear that the framework of the Rome Statute in response to non-cooperation is 
highly insufficient. Non-cooperation in arrest and surrender remains one of the biggest 
challenges facing the court.100 The mechanism for enforcing cooperation through the ASP 
and the Security Council has not been effective in addressing the problem, it has not cured 
previous non-cooperation neither was it able to prevent it. 
The lack of consequences has had an impact on the court’s ability to function fully and 
fulfil its mandate. It has also impacted the willingness of states to cooperate, it encourages 
                                                 
96 UN Security Council, 7337th meeting, 12 December 2014, S/PV.7337. 
97 Prosecutor v Omar Al Bashir, Decision informing the United Nations Security Council and the 
Assembly of States Parties of the Rome Statute about Omar Al Bashir recent visit to the Republic of 
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98 Statement of the Prosecutor of the ICC to the UNSC on the situation in Darfur, Sudan pursuant to 
UNSCR 1593 (2005). 
99 Negotiated relationship agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United 
Nations. 
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UNSCR 1970 (2011), 9 November 2017, the Prosecutor states in paragraph 47 “Failure to execute arrest 
warrants issued by the court also remains a major challenge.”   
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non-cooperation. It is therefore important for the Rome Statute to be revised with a view 
to enhancing the role of the ASP and the Security Council and give them capacity to 



















REALISING FULL COOPERATION IN ARREST AND SURRENDER: A CASE 
FOR REVIEW OF THE ROME STATUTE 
4.1 Introduction 
This study has in the preceding chapters demonstrated the importance of State cooperation 
in the arrest and surrender of suspects before the ICC and the negative effects of States’ 
non-cooperation on the court. The ICC has no ability to arrest suspects; therefore, it is fully 
dependent on States to arrest suspects on its behalf. When States decline cooperation, the 
court has no power to enforce cooperation as the court has not been equipped under the 
Rome Statute to directly enforce cooperation. A more indirect way is through the ASP and 
UNSC by referring cases of non-cooperation to the two institutions. The Rome Statute 
does not expressly provide the action to be taken by these institutions against a state 
referred for non-cooperation. It is therefore important that there is clearly defined action to 
be taken when a State is referred for non-cooperation. 
This chapter will therefore discuss and propose the use of sanctions by the ASP and UNSC 
as a way to enforce State cooperation with the ICC. It will also argue for review to provide 
for trials in absentia in cases where the court has been completely unable to procure the 
presence of the accused person. The first part discusses the precedents of cooperation in 
international criminal courts with a case analysis of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). This is because the ICTY was the first international 
Tribunal established by the Security Council and it had a cooperation regime that relied on 
State cooperation. The second part studies the use of diplomatic sanctions. The third part 
studies the prospects of trials in absentia as alternative to the court having no trial.  
4.2 The precedents: cooperation in arrest and surrender in the ICTY 
The ICTY is an ad hoc Tribunal that preceded the ICC. It was created by the Security 
Council under its Chapter VII powers. The Tribunal therefore derived its authority from 
the UN Charter through a Security Council Resolution.101 The resolution in paragraph four 
                                                 
101 UN Security Council resolution 827 of 1993 
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established an obligation for all states to fully cooperate with the Tribunal.102 This meant 
that all States had obligations to cooperate with the Tribunal by virtue of Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter and the express provision of the resolution.  
The enforcement regime of the Tribunal was centred on States; the tribunal did not have 
any enforcement mechanism. Just like the ICC it fully dependent on States to arrest and 
surrender suspects. The Statute of the ICTY expressly established obligations for all States 
to cooperate and comply without undue delay with any requests for assistance or orders of 
the Tribunal.103  
Cooperation by States in arrest and surrender with the ad hoc tribunal mirror the 
cooperation regime within the ICC. States play a very central role in the enforcement 
regimes of both institutions. The Tribunal having been created by a resolution of the 
Security Council essentially established binding obligations on all states unlike the Rome 
Statute of the ICC which primarily creates obligations for States parties. Despite the 
binding nature of Security Council resolutions, the ICTY faced similar challenges in 
cooperation like the ICC. The binding nature of the resolution did not deter States from 
failing to cooperate with the requests of the court. 
The ICTY does not have any enforcement powers to compel States to cooperate. When 
faced with lack of cooperation it relied on the Security Council to enforce States 
cooperation. The president of the Tribunal had authority to report to the Security Council 
States that failed to cooperate with its requests.104 The successive presidents made several 
reports to the Security Council on the non-cooperation of States with the requests and 
orders of the Tribunal.105 In 2017, in the annual report to the Security Council, the president 
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of the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT) which is the residual body 
of the ICTY and the ICTR, lamented the non-cooperation of Serbia and the inaction of the 
Security Council despite previous reports of the said non-cooperation.106 States’ non-
cooperation was still a big problem twenty -four years after the establishment of the 
Tribunal.  The Security Council has not taken any substantial steps to ensure or enforce 
cooperation of the States that have been reported. In these circumstances only the Security 
Council had power to enforce the duty to cooperate. The continued failure by the body to 
enforce the much-needed cooperation rendered the ICTY cooperation regime 
ineffective.107  
The lack of any substantial response by the Security Council had a negative effect on the 
court. The Tribunal was unable to start working immediately as it took some considerable 
time before it secured the presence of accused persons before it. The first indictment by 
the ICTY was for Dragan Nikolic on 4th November 1994. It took six years for him to be 
brought before the court, he was arrested and transferred to the Tribunal in April 2000 by 
the Multi National Stabilization Force (SFOR). It is worth noting that he was arrested by 
the stabilization force.108 This demonstrates the fact that it took the efforts of the force to 
ensure his arrest. Without the SFOR it might have taken much longer to hold him to 
account at the tribunal. However, Dusko Tadic was the first accused to be arrested and 
transferred to the Tribunal in April 1995 by German authorities, he had been indicted in 
February of the same year.109  
Some of the former Yugoslav States in whose territory some of the accused persons were 
in, did not have much enthusiasm to cooperate given that some of the accused persons were 
                                                 
republic-yugoslavia-security, letter dated 22 October 2002 from ICTY president to the Security 
Council available at http://www.icty.org/en/press/judge-claude-jorda-president-icty-reports-
continued-non-cooperation-federal-republic on 2 February 2019.   
106 UN Security Council 7960th meeting of 7 June 2017, S/PV.7960, 4. 
107 Mc Donald G K, Problems, obstacles and achievements of the ICTY, Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, 2, 2004, 560 and 562. 
108 Case information sheet available at 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragan_nikolic/cis/en/cis_nikolic_dragan.pdf on 6 February 2019.  
109 Case information sheet available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/cis/en/cis_tadic_en.pdf 
on 6 February 2019. 
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high ranking military and civilian officials.110 This meant that a considerable number of 
accused persons remained at large, which frustrated the proceedings before the tribunal. 
Ratko Mladic was one such long standing fugitive having been indicted on 25th July 1995. 
He was arrested and transferred to the Tribunal in May 2011, sixteen years later.111 The 
president stated in this regard “the Tribunal remains a partial failure-through no fault of its 
own-because a vast majority of indictees continue to remain free, seemingly enjoying 
absolute immunity.”112 In the subsequent report, the president reported that thirty-one 
indictees remained at large.113 It is worth noting that this report was made five years after 
the establishment of the ICTY. This demonstrates the effect that the failure to arrest 
accused persons has had on the effectiveness of the Tribunal and its ability to expeditiously 
dispense justice.   
4.3 The justification 
As it has been discussed in the preceding chapters and in the discussion on the cooperation 
in the ICTY, States do not voluntarily cooperate with the requests for arrest and surrender. 
States are influenced by various factors which ultimately determine whether they cooperate 
or not. This means that States cooperate on their own will, as and when it suits their 
interests. It then becomes clear that there is need for an alternative mechanism which the 
court can use to realize cooperation or mitigate the effects of the non-appearance of the 
accused. The enforcement mechanism as currently constituted is insufficient to enforce 
cooperation. The lack of cooperation by States and the lack of enforcement mechanisms 
has had a negative impact on the court and its ability to function effectively. It could have 
fatal consequences for international criminal justice.114 This therefore justifies the need to 
have coercive mechanisms that can be resorted to when there is willful non-cooperation by 
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111 Case information sheet available at 
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States on the court’s requests as well as holding trials in the absence of the accused when 
all efforts fail to yield the presence of an accused.  
These recommendations are justified by the fact that the ICC has a very fundamental role 
to fulfil in the fight against impunity, bringing to account perpetrators of the most atrocious 
crimes in the world and delivering justice to the victims of these crimes. The ability of the 
court to fulfil these noble objects should not be left to the will and whims of States. This 
justifies the need to compel States to comply with their obligations to arrest and surrender 
suspects of international crimes. It further justifies the need to provide for trials in absentia. 
Taking into account that States cooperate according to their interests, the object and 
purpose of international criminal justice would be lost if there was no alternative to the 
will of States. 
The ASP and the Security Council are the enforcement arms of the ICC. They have so far 
been unable to decisively deal with non-cooperation referred by the court. Because the 
court is fully dependent on the two institutions, they must as a matter of necessity grow 
some ‘teeth’ to carry out their enforcement mandate. It has been argued in this study and 
elsewhere that the ICC will only be effective when it will be able to enforce cooperation.115  
There is consensus that there is major weakness in the ICC enforcement regime, therefore 
it needs to be reviewed if the court is ever going to be effective. 
4.4 A case for diplomatic sanctions 
Sanctions are a means of coercion which can be economic, military or diplomatic. They 
are aimed at coercing a State to change its conduct on a specific question. Most literature 
on sanctions has been focused on economic sanctions and more recently on targeted 
sanctions. Sanctions have traditionally been used by the Security Council but over time 
have come to be used by States and other organizations.116 
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The efficacy of these sanctions is a highly contested subject in international law.117 There 
have been many arguments advanced on the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of sanctions. 
Critics have demonstrated why sanctions do not work while proponents have argued that 
sanctions work when clearly implemented. The traditional view has been that sanctions are 
only effective in exceptional scenarios.118 There has been debate on the effectiveness of 
the most studied sanctions in history. Drezner has argued that the sanctions in Iraq, Haiti 
and the former Republic of Yugoslavia were able to generate modest concessions.119 
Another argument advanced is that there is debate on whether sanctions work because of 
the difficulty of selection effect which is the bias of sample selection that brings to question 
the validity of the finding and the lack of consensus in the definition of success.120  
The use of sanctions includes the threat of sanctions and the actual imposition.121 There 
are instances when the threat as well as the imposition of sanctions have worked. In the 
ICTY the European Union (EU) and the United States of America employed the threat of 
sanctions and aid conditionalities in inducing States in the former Yugoslavia to cooperate 
with the Tribunal. These threats worked in inducing the States to cooperate with the court 
as is demonstrated by the arrest and surrender of Slobodan Milosevic. It has also been 
argued that the USA was successful in getting States some of which are States parties to 
the Rome Statute to sign forces immunity agreements by threatening to withhold military 
aid.122     
Diplomatic sanctions have been used as part of broader sanctions regimes. They are rarely 
used on their own. The use of diplomatic sanctioning on its own is not common in 
international law. They are mostly used as part of broader sanctions regimes involving 
economic sanctions and blockades. Their use and effectiveness independent of economic 
sanctions has not been studied extensively. This dissertation has therefore mostly relied on 
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arguments made in relation to the broad set of economic sanctions that incorporate 
diplomatic sanctions. Noting that the arguments broadly apply to sanctions, the same 
would be applicable to diplomatic sanctions independently. This dissertation posits that 
diplomatic sanctions are modelled in similar regimes and the factors influencing the 
success of sanctions generally would apply.    
The Security Council has imposed thirty sanctions regimes in various parts of the world, 
these sanctions have taken various forms that include economic sanctions, arms embargos 
and travel bans among others. Currently there are fourteen ongoing sanctions regimes.123  
The US has also used sanctions extensively as part of its policy. It has used diplomatic 
sanctions against certain States mostly in conjunction with its economic sanctions. It has 
also used them as measures associated with war. In some instances, it has used diplomatic 
sanctions on their own in attempts to induce regime change and in terrorism cases.124  
The effectiveness of sanctions as employed by the UN and the US and other States is still 
unresolved.125 The effectiveness has been argued depends on the number of States 
imposing, the number of issues under dispute and whether international organizations are 
involved. The argument here is that multilateral sanctions are more effective.126  
4.4.1 Proposed sanctions regime 
This thesis proposes the use of diplomatic sanctions as a means of coercing cooperation. It 
proposes for sanctions to be imposed by the ASP and UNSC. It is aimed at having clear 
consequences for non-cooperation spelt out in the Rome Statute. This will ensure that the 
UNSC which already has sanctioning power within its mandate has its work cut out for it.  
This argument is based on the acknowledgment that a referral for non-cooperation in 
practice means that the State in question willfully failed to cooperate.  
                                                 
123 https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/information on 8 March 2019. 
124 Miller T, Diplomacy derailed: the consequences of diplomatic sanctions, The Washington Quarterly, 
2010, 63. 
125 Taylor B, Chapter one: the sanctions debate, The Adelphi Papers, 2009, 23. 
126 Morgan C, Bapat N, Krustev V, The threat and imposition of sanctions, Conflict management and 
peace science, 2009, 93-103 
41 
 
This imposition therefore comes after the ASP procedure following a referral on non-
cooperation has been exhausted. This means that the ASP will engage in negotiations with 
the State in question with an aim to obtaining that State’s cooperation. When the State 
concerned has been engaged in accordance with the laid down procedure and the non-
cooperation still persists, then the ASP sets in motion its sanctions mechanism. It is 
proposed that the ASP needs to come up with a structured mechanism through which the 
sanctions are triggered and applied by members.   
4.4.2 Challenges to the effective use of sanctions. 
As already pointed out the use of sanctions is contested and there are some challenges that 
arise on the use of sanctions. There are arguments advanced against sanctions. The 
assertion that multilateral sanctions work because of the coordination of the States involved 
is contested. It has been argued that there is no evidence that multilateral sanctions have 
had more success that unilateral sanctions. Some scholars on the subject have identified 
cooperation and coordination as a key factor in the success of multilateral sanctions. 
Drezner posits that there is an assumed link between coordination and success of 
multilateral sanctions, but in reality, there is no empirical evidence that supports this 
argument. To the contrary, he argues that there is no link between the coordination and 
success of such sanctions. He further contends that, in fact there is a negative correlation 
between the two and has worse outcomes than unilateral sanctions.127 
Another practical challenge to the effective use of sanctions is the enforcement problem, 
this is a challenge of ensuring that all the States impose the sanctions when they are 
required to. Writers on sanctions have argued that multilateral sanctions fail because of 
enforcement difficulties. That States have been seen to backtrack on their initial promises 
to impose sanctions.128 This presents a problem and is a major weakness for the 
applicability of the proposals within this thesis that focus on the multilateral aspect and 
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expectation that all the States concerned in the interests of justice will stick to the 
agreements and promises to impose sanctions when called upon to do so. 
There is also the question of whether such drastic action such as imposition of sanctions 
will negatively impact the legitimacy of the ICC. The imposition of sanctions may be 
considered as an affront to sovereignty by some States. The ICC has been faced with the 
problem of non-cooperation which is a result of conflict between treaty obligations and 
sovereignty. States use the sovereignty argument when it suits them. It is clear from the 
provisions of the Rome Statute that States were aware that joining the Statute entailed 
surrendering some level of their sovereignty to the court. However, this fact 
notwithstanding, the proposal in this thesis is that the sanctions will be imposed by the 
ASP. The ASP is made up of States that are party to the Rome Statute, therefore in essence 
the sanctions are imposed by States and not the court. The argument here is that the 
sanctions are imposed by the international community noting the diverse membership of 
the Statute. It has been argued that when sanctions are imposed by the international 
community, they have a moral persuasion and arguments on sovereignty are unsustainable 
in that case. The sovereignty arguments are credible in the case of unilateral sanctions.129  
This study proposes the use of diplomatic sanctions by the ASP and Security Council. 
Diplomatic sanctions are used in the political and diplomatic relations. They include 
actions such as severance or interruption of diplomatic relations, coordinated recall of 
diplomatic representatives, closing of embassies and missions among other diplomatic 
measures.130  
This argument is based on the relationship among members of the ICC within the ASP 
which is political in nature. The ASP uses diplomacy in its engagement with States as 
shown by the ASP procedures in response to non-cooperation. The procedures consist of 
soft diplomatic approaches that have largely been unsuccessful in enforcing cooperation 
from states. 
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The argument for diplomatic sanctions is guided by how States operate and engage with 
each other. States engage and influence each other through diplomatic channels.131 The 
engagements at the ASP and Security Council are political and diplomatic, this is because 
States are inherently political creatures. They therefore need to be dealt with politically 
through diplomacy.  
The Rome Statute should therefore be reviewed to provide for the use of diplomatic 
sanctions by the ASP and Security Council. Sanctions are as a matter of practice imposed 
after there have been negotiations that have failed.132 Therefore, the ASP will undertake 
negotiations with the State in question with a view to ensure cooperation. The diplomatic 
sanctions will then only be imposed when the State fails to co-operate even after the 
negotiations have been exhausted. These will be actions taken by the ASP States 
collectively. The ASP needs to establish a comprehensive diplomatic sanctions regime 
which will be undertaken in a coordinated and collective manner by all the States parties. 
The ASP must be willing to put in the pressure on the non-cooperating State. They must 
be implemented collectively if these measures are to be effective. These institutions as the 
sole entities mandated to deal with non-cooperation must be given some element of 
coercive power to address non-cooperation. The Security Council already has this power 
under the UN Charter but has not been willing to go the extra mile to fulfil its mandate 
under the Rome Statute.  
4.5   A case for Trials in absentia 
Trials in absentia are trials that take place in the absence of an accused person. Such trials 
are generally an exception to the internationally recognized human right of an accused to 
be present at the trial.133 Trials in absentia are not common within common law domestic 
jurisdictions but some civil law jurisdictions permit them but they are not common in the 
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international jurisdiction.134 The general rule in criminal trials is that the accused person 
must be present during the trial. It is a basic guarantee of the right to a fair trial. 
In this thesis an argument is made for trials in absentia within the ICC. This is because as 
it has already been demonstrated that the absence of an accused person resulting from the 
non-cooperation of States has negative implications for the court and the interests of 
justice. Trials in absentia provide potential practical solution to the negative consequences 
of States’ non-cooperation in arrest and surrender of suspects.  
4.5.1 Trials in absentia in the ICC 
As it has already been pointed out, the presence of the accused person for trial is required 
before the ICC under Article 63(1) of the Rome Statute. Article 63(2) provides for the 
physical absence of the accused where he has been removed for disrupting the proceedings. 
This measure will be of last resort when all other alternatives have failed. However, the 
accused will be facilitated to observe the trial and instruct his counsel through 
communication technology. This is as far as the Statute allows for the absence of the 
accused. 
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence were amended by the ASP in 2013 to provide for 
situations where an accused person may apply to be excused from attending the trial.135 
Rule 134bis provides the possibility of an accused attending parts of the trial through video 
technology. Rule 134ter provides that an accused may apply to be excused and to be 
represented by counsel during parts of the trial. Such an application will only be granted if 
it is shown that exceptional circumstances justify the absence, other measures have proved 
inadequate, the accused has explicitly waived his right to be present at the trial, the rights 
of the accused will be fully guaranteed in his absence. Rule 134quater provides for an 
accused to apply to be excused from the trial and to be represented by counsel only due to 
extraordinary duties. These applications are to be determined on a case by case basis taking 
into account the specific hearings in question. Rule 134ter (3) provides that any absence 
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must be limited to what is strictly necessary and must not become the rule. In practice the 
court has been cautious in allowing the absence of the accused. The Trial Chamber granted 
conditional excusal to William Ruto on the basis of Rule 134 quater.136 The pre-trial 
confirmation of charges can be held in the absence of the accused.137 
4.5.2 Human Rights questions and the legitimacy of trials in absentia 
The right of the accused to be present at the trial is an internationally accepted basic human 
right. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in Article 14 gives 
the right for an accused person to be tried in his presence.138 Therefore, it can be interpreted 
to mean that trials in absentia are generally prohibited within that provision. Trying an 
accused person in their absence infringes on their fair trial rights that include the right to 
defend oneself or be defended by counsel of their own choice and the right to examine the 
evidence of witnesses. The provision in the ICCPR is explained by the UN Human Rights 
Committee in General Comment No.13 which gives the accused the rights to pursue all 
available defenses and to challenge the conduct of the case. It then also provides for the 
strict observance of the rights of the defense during exceptional circumstances when trials 
in absentia are justified.139 The most logical interpretation of Article 14 and General 
Comment No.13 is that trials in absentia are not entirely prohibited, they are the exception 
to the general rule. They can be permitted in rare exceptional circumstances. The Human 
Rights Committee does not provide what are the justified reasons for permitting trials in 
absentia. This leaves the courts to interpret and come up with justified reasons that would 
allow trials in absentia. This is perhaps in consideration that every case has its own 
peculiarities that courts have to consider. The HRC has determined that trials in absentia 
are permissible in some circumstances in the interests of justice.140 
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134 quater of 18 February 2014. 
137 Rule 124, 125, 126, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICC 
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The European Court of Human Rights determined this issue in Krombach v France141 the 
court held that if a trial in absentia is to be permitted, elaborate safeguards must be provided 
for the accused. The accused must have notice of the intended trial, the accused has to 
unequivocally waive his right to be present, the accused must have the right to be 
represented and the accused must be able to obtain fresh determination of the merits of the 
charges. The court further held that trials in absentia are not necessarily incompatible with 
the rights of the accused person provided the safeguards have been guaranteed. This 
demonstrates that there are circumstances that trials in absentia must be conducted in the 
interests of justice. 
Within the International ad hoc Tribunals, the overall trend that can be observed is that 
trials in absentia are generally not allowed. The International Military Tribunal in 
Nuremberg had provision that allowed trials in absentia. Article 12 of its Charter expressly 
allowed for trials to take place in the absence of the accused person in the event that the 
accused has not been found or when the Tribunal finds it necessary to conduct the hearing 
in his absence.142 The rules of procedure required that the accused be notified of the charges 
against him.143 In practice, the IMT applied this provision in the case of Martin Bormann 
who was tried and sentenced to death in absentia. Prior to his trial in absentia, notice was 
given to him though radio and newspaper announcements. A counsel was then appointed 
for him to conduct his defense in his absence.144  
The ICTY and ICTR did not have provision for trials in absentia. The accused’s right to 
be present during the trial was explicit in the Statutes for both Tribunals.145 The rules of 
procedure had a provision which allowed for a reconfirmation of the charges of an accused 
in his absence. In this reconfirmation, the indictment and all the evidence are submitted to 
                                                 
141 Dieter Krombach v France, ECtHR Judgment of 13 February 2001. 
142 Article 12, London Charter of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, “the Tribunal shall 
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145 Article 21(4)(d) of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes.  
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the Trial Chamber in an open and public session. The Trial Chamber would then issue an 
international warrant of arrest but no determination on the merits of the charges or guilt of 
the accused is made. This reconfirmation was only permitted when a warrant of arrest has 
not been executed or served on the accused person. The Prosecutor has the burden of 
satisfying the court that all reasonable steps have been taken but the accused still remains 
at large.146 
In the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the accused has the right to be tried in his 
presence under Article 17(4)(d) of the Statute. The Rules of Procedure provide exceptions 
to this general rule of trial in the presence of the accused. Rule 60 provides two exceptions 
where a trial can proceed in the absence of the accused. Firstly, where an accused person 
has made an appearance before the court but then declines to make further appearance and 
secondly, when the accused is at large and has declined to appear. The court must be 
satisfied that the accused has expressly or by implication waived his right to be present.147 
The rule here essentially provides for trial in absentia despite the right of the accused to be 
present. In the case of Augustine Gbao charged with two others, the court proceeded with 
the trial in his absence finding that he had waived his right to be present when he declined 
to make subsequent appearance before the court. The court held that trial in absentia is 
permissible and lawful in limited circumstances.148 The court took into consideration the 
delay and injustice that would be occasioned if the trial was to be stopped due to his refusal 
to appear. It is a decision made in the interests of justice. 
In the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), the accused has a right to be tried in his 
presence but that right is conditional and subject to the provisions of Article 22.149 Article 
22 provides for trials in absentia. A trial can proceed in the absence of the accused under 
three express conditions: when the accused has to expressly waive his right to be present; 
when he has not been surrendered by the State concerned; and when he cannot be found 
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despite all reasonable efforts having been made to avail and notify him of the charges.150 
The accused person must be notified of the charges against him and if after thirty days the 
accused fails to appear, the Trial Chamber will commence the proceedings in absentia 
where the court will provide counsel for the accused.151 The accused has a right for 
retrial.152There has been debate on whether the STL is actually an international tribunal or 
an extension of the Lebanese domestic system noting the nature of the crimes within its 
jurisdiction. Thus, whether its use of trials in absentia falls within the international 
sphere.153 Chris Jenks has argued that the STL’s provisions permitting trials in absentia 
make the Tribunal illegitimate as they violate the ICCPR guarantees.154 It has also been 
argued that the overriding objectives of criminal justice to punish an accused are not served 
by trials in absentia therefore they have no practical results while the right of retrial 
presents an expensive justice given the cost implications of international trials.155 While 
the cost aspect is a real issue especially for the ICC where availing witnesses and evidence 
bears serious costs, the real question would be whether cost implications should be a bar 
to the ends of justice especially for the victims. The answer is a resounding no, justice is 
far much more important than money. The court is similarly incurring costs during the long 
periods of inactivity in the absence of the accused.  
It is clear that although the legitimacy of trials in absentia is contested and international 
tribunals have not used them much, they are not entirely inconsistent with the rights of the 
accused person provided that certain minimum guarantees are afforded to the absent 
accused. A trial in absentia can only be deemed valid if the accused person enjoys the same 
rights as though he was present and that a right of retrial is afforded when the accused 
eventually if ever avails himself before the court. The right to a counsel of their choice or 
appointed by the court as well as the right to a retrial essentially provide legitimacy to the 
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process as well as a remedy as the accused will be fully represented by counsel and enjoy 
all other consequent rights as if he was there, it will only be his physical presence that is 
lacking. Having argued on the lawfulness of trials in absentia in specific circumstances, 
this study further argues that trials in absentia can be useful and practical in international 
criminal justice. Punishment is not the only objective of criminal trials especially 
internationally. International criminal justice gives a voice to the victims as well as sending 
a message that impunity is not tolerated.  
The Rome Statute therefore needs to be reviewed to provide for trials in absentia in 
situations where all reasonable steps have been made to present the accused before the 
court. Notice must be given through all forms of communication internationally and within 
the State where the accused person is of the charges and the intention to hold the trial. 
Further guarantees should be provided that the accused person must be represented by 
counsel who must be facilitated to effectively defend the accused. Finally, a right for a 
retrial or redetermination of the charges depending on the circumstances of the case must 
be given. This is to ensure that such trials are in compliance with international human rights 
standards 
 4.6 Conclusion  
The propositions made in this chapter are made against the backdrop of the serious 
challenge that has faced the ICC and the consequent inability to proceed with the trials 
before it because of the absence of the accused. 
The use and effectiveness of sanctions has been a hot debate over the years. While 
sanctions have not been effective a hundred percent, they have been proven to have worked 
in some cases. Effective sanctions require sufficient coordination by all States. Sanctions 
have the potential to achieve some results. It is on this basis that the argument in this 
chapter has been advanced. The objects of international criminal justice demand that States 
must take action to ensure that the ICC fulfils the ideals and purposes for which it was 
established. In simple terms, international criminal justice must work and States must put 
in the efforts to make it work.     
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Conducting trials in absentia though not the most ideal case is a necessity, it is the option 
of last resort for the court. Having noted its inability to enforce cooperation of States in 
arrest and surrender and the inordinate periods of inactivity owing to the absence of the 
accused. The absence of the accused means that they are holding the court at ransom. The 
trials in absentia are then aimed at giving a voice to the victims as well as showcasing to 
the world the horrific actions of the accused. This will help to administer some kind of 
justice to the victims notwithstanding that the accused has not been punished and send a 





















CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction  
This thesis set out to examine the non-cooperation of States in arrest and surrender within 
the ICC. The main objectives of the study are to identify the major factors that account for 
the non-cooperation, to analyse the Rome Statute sanctioning power to determine its 
effectiveness in addressing non-cooperation and to explore possible practical solutions to 
be implemented to deal with non-cooperation. The preceding chapters have examined in 
detail all the questions advanced. This chapter will provide a conclusion of the thesis and 
give recommendations. 
5.2 Summary of the findings 
Conclusions from a review of all the relevant literature on the research questions have 
confirmed that States’ cooperation is fundamental to the effective functioning of the ICC. 
Without cooperation from States in arrest and surrender the ICC is unable to work. States 
non-cooperation is one of the major challenges facing the ICC. This research has further 
confirmed that the ICC has no power under the Rome Statute to enforce cooperation. It is 
fully dependent on the ASP and Security Council to enforce cooperation.  
Lack of co-operation has generated delay in the proceedings of the court, which has 
resulted in higher operational costs. The court has so far dedicated time and resources 
towards the investigations and cases while the accused still remain at large. This means 
that the cases are dormant while the court remains in a state of inactivity as it awaits the 
arrest and surrender of the accused persons.  
The lack of enforcement mechanisms and powers to compel or sanction States for non-co-
operation has further encouraged and emboldened States not to co-operate. The number of 
States that have been able to get away with non-cooperation without any consequence 
contributes to more instances of non-cooperation by States. Therefore, the lack of clear and 
concrete consequences and sanctions for non-co-operation encourages States to act in their 
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interests and disregard the orders and requests of the court. The lack of enforcement 
capacity is one of the threats to the ability of the court to achieve its fundamental mandate, 
it thus renders the ICC highly ineffective and generally at the mercy of States that are 
driven by their own interests and rarely act inconsistently with their interests. 
States fail to cooperate with the court for various reasons. Some of the key factors 
identified include conflict of interests and obligations, immunity questions, ICC’s lack of 
enforcement powers and perceptions of bias in the choice of cases. These factors have 
contributed in various degrees to the non-cooperation facing the court. It is also clear that 
the court has not been able to obtain cooperation even after making referrals to the ASP 
and the UNSC. There is a clear schism between the court’s judicial functions and its 
enforcement arms which is the two institutions.     
As demonstrated the ICC’s effectiveness depends on States co-operation in arrest and 
surrender. Without the accused persons before the court, the court cannot proceed with 
trials. It is therefore clear that when States fail to arrest and surrender accused persons, the 
court cannot function. The failure to arrest and surrender accused persons is therefore 
heavily impacting on the court’s effectiveness. 
The mechanism for enforcing cooperation through the ASP and the Security Council has 
not been effective in addressing the problem, it has not cured previous non-cooperation 
neither was it able to prevent it. 
The lack of consequences within the Rome Statute has had an impact on the court’s ability 
to function fully and fulfill its mandate. This has also impacted the willingness of States to 
cooperate, it encourages non-cooperation. It is therefore, important for the Rome Statute 
to be revised with a view to enhancing the role of the ASP and the Security Council and 
give them capacity to sanction or punish States that refuse to cooperate with the requests 
of the court for arrest and surrender 
Conclusions from review of literature on sanctions confirm that the threat or the imposition 
of sanctions might potentially contribute to cooperation of states. These sanctions must be 
imposed in a collective and coordinated manner if they are to have any significant impact 
on States cooperation. To have an effective sanctions regime, the ASP and Security 
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Council must put in the necessary work to establish an elaborate diplomatic sanctions 
regime. They must also be ready to put pressure on all States to collectively apply the 
sanctions in a coordinated form.  
Sanctions will have more impact if they are applied by all members at the same time. The 
importance of diplomatic relations among nations is based on the arguments that if a large 
number of States, collectively threaten or impose coordinated diplomatic sanctions, the 
State in question might be induced to cooperate. The threat of sanctions in terms of 
withholding military financing was successful for the US in obtaining immunity 
agreements with States. Similarly, the EU and World Bank threats of financial sanctions 
to Serbia successfully induced Serbia to surrender Slobodan Milosevic to the ICTY. 
The study also confirmed that the history of the effectiveness of sanctions has been 
controversial. Sanctions may work or they may not work. Therefore, there is need for more 
research and thought by scholars on alternative ways through which States cooperation can 
be improved.  
The conclusions on trials in absentia confirm that the legitimacy of trials in absentia is 
contested. However, they are not entirely inconsistent with the rights of the accused person 
provided that certain minimum guarantees are afforded to the accused. A trial in absentia 
can only be deemed valid if the accused person enjoys the same rights as though he was 
present and that a right of retrial is afforded when the accused eventually if ever avails 
himself before the court. The right to a counsel of their choice or appointed by the court as 
well as the right to a retrial essentially provide legitimacy to the process as well as a remedy 
as the accused will be fully represented by counsel and enjoy all other consequent rights 
as if he was there, it will only be his physical presence that is lacking.  
Having argued on the lawfulness of trials in absentia in specific circumstances, this thesis 
further argues that trials in absentia can be useful and practical in international criminal 
justice. International criminal justice gives a voice to the victims as well as sending a 





5.3 Recommendations  
This thesis recommends a review of the Rome Statute to provide in certainty the actions to 
be taken by the ASP and Security Council when a referral for non-cooperation is made. 
The Rome Statute’s uncertainty on the actions that follow a referral for non-cooperation 
has been made, has contributed to the weakness of the enforcement regime. This 
recommendation is for review of the Rome Statute to provide for use of diplomatic 
sanctions on States that fail to cooperate with the ICC.  
Given the nature of the effects that non-cooperation has on the ability of the court to be 
effective, the imposition of sanctions provides a coercive mechanism that can be used to 
compel States to cooperate with the court’s requests for arrest and surrender. The proposed 
sanctions are to be imposed by the ASP as a last resort when the diplomatic avenues within 
its response procedures have been exhausted with no success. Therefore, the proposed 
sanctions will be imposed by the ASP through its members as part of its final response to 
non-cooperation.     
This thesis also recommends a review of the Rome Statute to provide for trials in absentia 
in situations where all reasonable steps have been made to present the accused before the 
court.  
The recommended provisions should include; notice to be given through all forms of 
communication internationally and within the State where the accused person is of the 
charges and the intention to hold the trial. Further, guarantees should be provided that the 
accused person must be represented by counsel who must be facilitated to effectively 
defend the accused. Finally, a right for a retrial or redetermination of the charges depending 
on the circumstances of the case must be given. This will ensure that such trials are in 
compliance with international human rights standards. 
The recommendation is grounded on the main objectives of international criminal justice. 
The ideals of international criminal justice aim to among others punish the most 
responsible perpetrators of international crimes, give victims a voice while delivering 
justice to them and fighting impunity. It is this basis that the justification for trials in 
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absentia is made. Accused persons wanted before the ICC remaining at large mostly with 
the complicity of States is the highest level of impunity. To reject this impunity, trials in 
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